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Comments
CRIMINAL LAw-DEcisIONS BY THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT DURING THE
YEAR 1940*
LATNEY BARNES
During the year 1940 the Missouri Supreme Court handed down forty-eight
decisions involving violations of the state's criminal code or related to the adminis-
tration thereof. Two represented unsuccessful appeals by the state from judgments
quashing informations charging violations of the "filled milk" statutes;' two were
cases ousting a prosecuting attorney2 and a sheriff3 from their respective offices
for failure to perform their'duties in enforcing the criminal laws; one was a
habeas corpus proceeding limited to a denial of bail to one charged with murder
in the first degree where the court concluded that from the evidence offered at
the time of the hearing on the application for bail there was "proof evident and
presumption great";4 one determined the proper judge to pass upon a motion to
set aside a parole granted by a special judge after the regular judge had been
sworn off of the bench;5 and one determined the chronological order in which a
parolee whose parole had been revoked for the commission of a second crime should
serve the sentences. 6 The remaining forty-one cases represent appeals from con-
victions in felony cases. Only two were reversed outright-one on the evidence
and one on the construction of the words of a statute-six were reversed and re-
manded, and the remaining thirty-three, or eighty per cent, were affirmed.
Numerically the cases present a further decline in the number of cases decided
yearly by the court. During the previous year, 1939, the court had decided forty-
*This comment should be read with the symposium on The Work of the
Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1940 (1941) 6 Mo. L. Rev. 381.
1. State v. Hershman, 346 Mo. 892, 143 S. W. (2d) 1025 (1940), and State
v. Gilden, 143 S. W. (2d) 1027 (Mo. 1940), holding defective the informations
which failed to charge that the product sold was "in imitation or semblance of
milk." While the offense charged was a misdemeanor, since the constitutional
validity of the statutes involved were challenged, the jurisdiction to hear the appeal
was in the supreme court.
2. State ex 1nf. McKittrick v. Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 144 S. W. (2d) 91
(1940).
3. State ex Inf. McKittrick v. Williams, 346 Mo. 1003, 144 S. W. (2d) 98
(1940).
4. Ex parte Johnson, 142 S. W. (2d) 651 (Mo. 1940).
5. State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Kelly, 346 Mo. 416, 142 S. W. (2d) 27 (1940).
See a further discussion of this case in the principal article.
6. Herring v. Scott (habeas corpus), 142 S. W. (2d) 670 (Mo. 1940),
also noted further in the principal article.
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eight cases; but contrast this with the 164 cases decided in 1927 and the average of
89.2 for the ten year period from 1927 to 1936.7
I. THE APPEAL
A. Jurisdiction of the supreme court on appeal
Even though the offense charged be a misdemeanor, where the constitutionality
of the statute is challenged, the appeal lies to the supreme court, and where the
court can and does dispose of the case on other grounds, it need not pass on the
constitutional question raised even though that be the only ground for its juris-
diction. 8
B. The application for an appeal
Section 4130, Missouri Revised Statutes 1939,9 requires that a defendant
desiring to appeal shall "file his written application for such appeal." In State v.
Wilson,0 the defendant had filed an affidavit for an appeal conforming to the
requirements of the code of civil procedure in relation to appeals, stating in part
"Wilson . . . makes oath and says that the appeal prayed for in the above
entitled cause is not made for vexation or delay, but because affiant believes that
the appellant is aggrieved by the judgment and decision of the court." The attorney
general contended that the affidavit filed did not constitute a "written application"
required by the statute, did not purport to contain a prayer for an appeal, and
that the language in the affidavit was phrased in the past tense as if at some
previous stage a prayer or application for the appeal had been made. The court
ruled, however, that the affidavit filed constituted a substantial compliance with
the requirement of the criminal statute and overruled the state's motion to dismiss
the appeal. A contrary ruling would have seemed unduly technical and oppressive.
C. Questions presented for review
In State v. Cantrell,"1 defendant appealed from his conviction but filed no
bill of exceptions in the trial court. The clerk of the circuit court, however, sent
to the supreme court what purported to be copies of the motion for new trial,
instructions, and other papers said to have been on file in his office. The court
ruled that it could consider only the record proper, and that the motion for new
trial, instructions, etc., not having been properly preserved in a properly authenti-
cated and filed bill of exceptions, did not constitute a part of the record proper
and therefore were not subject to review.
7. See Hyde, The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1938
(Court Organization) (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 348.
8. See note 1, supra. See also Taylor v. Dimmitt, 336 Mo. 330, 78 S. W.
(2d) 841 (1934).
9. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3740.
10. 345 Mo. 862, 136 S. W. (2d) 993 (1940).
11. 346 Mo. 790, 142 S. W. (2d) 1057 (1940).
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In examination of prospective jurors on the voir dire in State v. Ring,12 a
prosecution for homicide occurring at a tavern at which both the defendant and
the deceased had been guests, one of the jurors replied that he was "just prejudiced
against those kind of places" and "prejudiced against that sort of thing." The
trial court denied the defendant's challenge for cause. The supreme court upheld
the ruling, stating that the juror had never manifested any prejudice or antipathy
toward the defendant personally---"only that hostility toward crime, as crime, and
places where they think it has a tendency to be fostered, that is felt by all good
men." Since both the defendant and the deceased had been guests at the night
club, any feeling against one in attendance there would seemingly apply to all. The
court ruled that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to allow
the challenge for cause.
In the trial of one charged with robbery it was not error for the court to
sustain objections to questions put to the jury by the defendant's attorney, such
as, "You are in a position to distinguish between assault and robbery, are you
not?" and "You know the difference between assault and robbery?" Counsel may
not implant in the jury's minds the idea that they should independently draw
legal distinctions, for the jury must be guided by the court's instructions on such
questions. 3 The questions propounded were improper.
B. The informations
An information charging kidnapping and concluding "contrary to the form
of the statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity
of the State, and contrary to Section No. 4020, R. S. 1929" was attacked on the
ground that it did not comply with the requirement of Article VI, Section 38 of
the Constitution of Missouri, requiring that all indictments shall conclude, "against
the peace and dignity of the State."1 4 The offending words following "against the
peace and dignity of the State" were rejected as surplusage, and the information
held valid.
In State v. Quinn,'15 an information charging burglary of property belonging
to "Phillips 66 Oil Company, a Corp." was held not defective even though it was
shown that the true name of the corporation was "Phillips Petroleum Company."
The court ruled that there was no fatal variance between the charge and the
proof, and that the information was sufficiently certain to bar any further prosecu-
tion for the same offense.
In State v. Bowdry,16 a prosecution for obtaining a check by false pretenses,
12. 346 Mo. 290, 141 S.'W. (2d) 57 (1940).
13. State v. Ford, 346 Mo. 882, 143 S. W. (2d) 289 (1940).
14. State v. Ashworth, 346 Mo. 869, 143 S. W. (2d) 279, 283 (1940).
15. 345 Mo. 855, 136 S. W. (2d) 985 (1940).
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the court held that a charge that one "was induced to turn over and deliver to" the
defendant a certain check does not charge that the party did deliver the check
to the defendant, but where, as in the instant case, the information also charges
that by means of the false representations the defendant "obtained" the check it
is sufficient in that particular. The court overruled State v. Phelan,'7 insofar
as it is out of harmony with the instant case. In the Phelan case the court's
opinion was limited to holding bad the charge "were induced . . . to sell and
deliver" without considering or passing upon the effect of the words "did obtain
and receive, etc." According to the instant case these last words, had the question,
been raised in the Phelan case, should have been held equivalent to the charge
"and did sell and deliver."
C. Evidence
An objection by a defendant to the testimony of a witness whose name had
not been endorsed on the information until he was called was held not entitled
to consideration where he did not file" an affidavit of surprise or motion to quash
the information, and did not demand that he be given a reasonable time within
which to meet the testimony. "' And where a defendant is charged with knowingly
having received numerous articles of stolen property and the evidence discloses
that some of the articles were received on one day and some the following day,
the defendant is called upon to file a motion requiring the state to elect, and if
he does so, and the state does elect, the defendant is not prejudiced.' 9
State v. York20 holds that an accused is not entitled to impeach the credibility
of a state's witness by showing that the witness was in jail and charged with,
although not convicted of, robbery. It is to be noted that in four of the five cases
cited by the court as upholding this rule of law the situation arose in a different
manner.2' In those cases the state was attempting to discredit witnesses called
by the defendant which it had charged with but not yet convicted of crimes.
In the instant case, however, the state has by its own act charged its own witness
with crime. Shall it thereafter be heard to say that the charge brought by it
is false and the witness' character and, credibility unaffected thereby? It would
seem that the defendant should have been allowed to assert this inconsistent
position of the state in vouching for a witness by calling him to testify while at
the same time charging him with crime. It would seem that the defendant should
have been allowed to show the state's anomalous position with reference to the
particular witness.
The court reaffirmed the old rules that conviction of statutory rape can be
17. 159 Mo. 122, 60 S. W. 71 (1900).
18. State v. Derrington, 137 S. W. (2d) 468 (Mo. 1940).
19. Ibid.
20. 142 S. W. (2d) 91 (Mo. 1940).
21. The fifth case cited by the court, State v. Menz, 341 Mo. 74, 106 S. W. (2d)
440 (1937), may also be distinguished from the instant case. There the state's
witness was charged with crime by another and different state other than the state
producing him as a witness.
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sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix; 22 that conjecture,
suspicion or surmise is not sufficient as a basis for a conviction Qf larceny;23 and
that the "utmost resistance" doctrine does not apply where the woman is put in
fear of personal violence and her will thereby overcome-a consent induced by
fear being no consent.24
In State v. Benson,2 5 a prosecution for homicide, where the defendant claimed
self-defense and testified that the deceased had said to the defendant, "I didn't
kill you the other time, I will now," and that he had in fact been shot once by
the deceased several hours before the fatal shooting, it was error to admit testimony
on the part of the state that the deceased had stated to a third person, not in the
presence of the defendant, that the defendant had been shot while deceased and
defendant were prowling in a garage, the testimony being hearsay, a mere narration
of a past event, not part of the res gestac and not a dying declaration. No objec-
tion can be found with the ruling of the court.
Where insanity is interposed as a defense in a criminal prosecution, great
latitude should be allowed by the trial court in an investigation of the subject, and
evidence which would in any substantial way tend to show that the defendant's
nervous organization was affected should be admitted, and even lay witnesses may
express an opinion on insanity, based on facts ascertained from personal contact,
conversation and the like, although such observations were not made for the pur-
pose of forming an opinion as to the sanity of the person. But since Missouri
does not recognize the defense of "volitional insanity" (which means that although
the accused can distinguish between right and wrong, still he is unable to resist
the impulse to commit the criminal act), a trial court did not err in excluding
proffered testimony of a physician that he had treated the defendant 17 to 21
years before the trial, had never examined him since, but had seen the defendant
off an on and had frequently passed the time of day with him, as to his opinion
of defendant's mental condition, where the testimony was not offered to show
that the defendant was insane, but only offered for the purpose of showing de-
fendant was not a normally minded person, one of feeble intellect and weak
intelligence.26 The court further held that while there is a common-law presump-
tion that an infant between the ages of 7 and 14 has no criminal capacity, there
is no such presumption in favor of an adult of that mental age.
22. State v. Lawson, 136 S. W. (2d) 992 (Mo. 1940).
23. State v. Wilson, 345 Mo. 862, 136 S. W. (2d) 993 (1940). See also
State v. Schneiders, 345 Mo. 899, 137 S. W. (2d) 439 (1940), holding evidence
insufficient for a conviction of manslaughter arising from the death of a pedestrian
struck by an automobile.
24. State v. Moore, 143 S. W. (2d) 288 (Mo. 1940).
25. 346 Mo. 497, 142 S. W. (2d) 52 (1940).
26. State v. Jackson, 346 Mo. 474, 142 S. W. (2d) 45 (1940). Note, how-
ever, that the Jackson case defines "volitional insanity" as meaning that although
the accused can distinguish between right and wrong, still he is unable because of
mental disease to resist, while State v. West, 346 Mo. 563, 142 S. W. (2d) 468(1940), indicates that where the "irresistible impulse" is dne to a diseased mind,
it is, in effect, insanity.
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D. Instructions
In view of the requirement of the statute27 that the court, whether requested
to do so or not, "must instruct the jury in writing upon all questions of law
arising in the case which are necessary for their information in giving their verdict,"
it was error in a murder prosecution where there was evidence that the homicide
was accidental to fail to instruct on accidental homicide even though such in-
struction was not requested by the defendant.28 But an instruction given by the
court which was correct as far as it went was good against a contention by a de-
fendant that a broader instruction should have been given where the defendant
did not request a broader instruction than the one given.29 The court distinguished
the case of State v. Adler,30 where a broader instruction had been requested by
the defendant but refused by the trial court. And in a murder prosecution where
insanity was the sole defense, where there was nothing in the evidence that could
be allowed to justify the "heat of passion" necessary to destroy the element of
deliberation, the defendant was either guilty of murder in the first degree or not
guilty by reason of insanity, and the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct
on second degree murder.21 And it was held unnecessary to define the word
"operate" in a prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and
where a defendant admitted on cross-examination two or three prior convictions
the court was not called upon to instruct that such evidence should be considered-
only as affecting his credibility as a witness, absent such a request on the part
of the defendant. 32
E. The argument of counsel
The failure of a co-indictee to testify after being produced and sworn by a
defendant but not called to testify was held to be a legitimate matter for comment
by the prosecuting attorney. 33 And it was held proper for a prosecuting attorney
to state in argument that a witness for the defendant had deliberately stated
a falsehood, the court appropriately remarking, "He cannot be expected to tell
the jury that all of the defendant's witnesses were truthful." 34 But where the
accused, while -nder arrest, answered only questions relating to his name, age
27. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 4070.
28. State v. Crowley, 345 Mo. 1177, 139 S. W. (2d) 473 (1940). Of course
the point must properly be preserved in the motion for new trial. See State v.
Ray, 225 S. W. 969, 973 (Mo. 1920).
29. State v. Fultz, 142 S. W. (2d) 39 (Mo. 1940). Defendant contended
that an instruction on self-defense did not include his right to defend against others
than the deceased and defendant had introduced evidence that two or three others
followed deceased as deceased advanced upon defendant.
30. 146 Mo. 18, 47 S. W. 794, 796 (1898).
31. State v. West, 346 Mo. 563, 142 S. W. (2d) 468 (1940).
32. State v. Davis, 143 S. W. (2d) 244 (Mo. 1940).
33. State v. Quinn, 345 Mo. 855, 136 S. W. (2d) 985, 987 (1940). For a
detailed discussion of the question see State v. Greer, 321 Mo. 589, 12 S. W. (2d)
87, 90 (1928).
34. State v. Woods, 346 Mo. 538, 142 S. W. (2d) 87 (1940).
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and residence and thereafter refused to answer questions stating that he did not
want to incriminate himself or someone else, his refusal to answer, being equivalent
to silence, cannot be shown and the prosecuting attorney may not refer to it in
his argument to the jury.3 5 The court distinguished this situation from silence of an
accused when not v/nder arrest. Silence of an accused under such circumstances,
when not under arrest, that only a guilty person would remain silent may be
shown on the theory of an inferential admission against interest. After arrest, all
duty to speak comes to an end.
In State v. Willard,8 a prosecution for larceny, the attorney for the state,
in the presence of the jury panel stated, "It doesn't make any difference who is
taken off (the jury panel). We would as soon try the case before any twelve."
Defendant moved to quash the jury panel on the theory that it was a violation of
Section 23, Rule 35 of the Supreme Court, which says, "All attempts to curry
favor with juries by fawning, flattery or pretended solicitude for their personal
comfort are unprofessional, etc." It appeared, however, from an interrogation
of the panel, that only two of them had fully heard and understood the statement
(but these two were among the twelve jurors finally chosen), and that the state-
ment had been made by the state's attorney when he had come from an anteroom,
where he and two others had been engaged in making the challenges for the state,
for the purpose of requesting the court for a little additional time; that when
the judge directed him to go back and complete the challenges, saying he was too
slow, the objectional words were spoken. The supreme court held that the words
could hardly be regarded as flattery justifying a quashal of the whole panel,
"because it would be obvious to the twelve jurors chosen, even if the remark had
not been made, that counsel were willing to submit the case to them. The only
jurors that could be offended would be those stricken from the list by the
adversary litigant; and, of course, they would not sit in the case." But the jurors
chosen might just as well have concluded that they were all objectionable to the
defendant, but not objectionable to the degree or extent of those struck off by
the defendant. The ruling of the court allows the state to assume the role of the
lily-pure whose case is so open and above-board, forthright and honest, that there
is no necessity for it to pick and choose among men in the selection of a jury, and
if the defendant does not do likewise he is placed in the position of inferentially
admitting that his case might not be acceptable to all. It is difficult to conceive
what the court would hold flattering enough to a jury to require a reversal if the
words here do not.
The state also called a witness to the stand for the avowed purpose of proving
the defendant's reputation, the defendant not having put his own reputation in
issue. Over the defendant's objection the attorney for the state was permitted
to ask the question inquiring as to the defendant's general reputation in the com-
munity as a law abiding citizen. The court promptly sustained the objection, in-
35. State v. Bowdry, 346 Mo. 1090, 145 S. W. (2d) 127 (1940).
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structed the jury. to disregard it, and rebuked the counsel, stating in the presence
of the jury that the law had been settled for 35 or 40 years that such reputation
is admissible only when the defendant has put his own reputation in issue. The
court held that no error had been committed; that until the words as a law abiding
citizen were uttered, from aught that appeared the state might have been inquiring
about the defendant's reputation for truth and veracity, a proper sphere of in-
quiry after the defendant had testified; and that the trial court's sustaining of
the objection and rebuke to the counsel who had propounded the question kept
out all error. It is true that the trial court valiantly attempted to prevent error.
But even its rebuke to the state's attorney had embedded in it a drop of poison
to prejudice the jury against the defendant in the statement of the judge that
such evidence was admissible only when the defendant put his reputation in
issue. Must not the jury have concluded that the defendant's reputation was bad,
else why would he not put it in issue? It is suggested that taking into considera-
tion the several remarks of counsel the case should have been remanded.3r
F. Parole matters
In State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Kelly,38 one Smith pleaded guilty to a charge
of embezzlement before a special judge, first having disqualified the regular judge
of the court where he was indicted. The special judge who accepted the plea
granted a parole upon the recommendation of eleven of the twelve grand jurors
who had returned the indictment. Thereafter, the prosecuting attorney filed a
motion to set aside the judgment granting the parole, alleging, among other things,
that the defendant had practiced a fraud on the court by falsely representing to
the grand jurors that the several shortages had been repaid and that the prose-
cuting attorney would consent to a parole for that reason. The defendant chal-
lenged the jurisdiction of the regular judge to sit on the hearing of the motion
to set aside the judgment granting the parole inasmuch as he had been disqualified
to sit as a judge in the case upon the merits. The regular judge overruled the
m6tion challenging his jurisdiction, heard and sustained the motion to set aside
the judgment granting the parole, and ordered the defendant committed to the
penitentiary under his original sentence. The defendant procured a writ of
habeas corpus from the Springfield Court of Appeals. That court ruled that the
regular judge, having been disqualified, had no right to act in any way in con-
nection with the case, except in calling a special judge to determine the matter,
set aside the order of the regular judge revoking the parole, and remanded the
cause, directing that it "be passed on by the Special Judge in the case, or by some
other judge legally selected." 3 9 The prosecuting attorney then applied to the supreme
37. See State v. Banton, 342 Mo. 45, 111 S. W. (2d) 516 (1937), cited in
the instant case, holding prejudicially erroneous a statement by a prosecuting
attorney to a jury panel on their voir dire that defendant had taken a change of
,venue.
38. 346 Mo. 416, 142 S. W. (2d) 27 (1940).
39. Ex parte Smith, 232 Mo. App. 521, 119 S. W. (2d) 65 (1938).
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court for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the regular judge from calling a special
judge to sit on the hearing of the motion to set aside the judgment granting the
parole. The supreme court granted the writ, holding that the motion was an
independent action in equity, and that the regular judge was the proper one to
pass on the motion unless he be (thereafter) disqualified by the defendant, under
the statute.
In Herring v. Scott,40 a habeas corpus proceeding, a prisoner had been paroled
from a penitentiary sentence and while out on parole had committed and been
convicted of a second offense and again sentenced and returned to the penitentiary.
After serving part of his second sentence he was again paroled from said second
sentence but was rearrested on the ground that the parole from the first sentence
had been revoked. The court ruled that under the statute41 providing that if any
convict, while under sentence, shall commit any crime, the sentence for such crime
shall not commence to run until expiration of the sentence under which he may
be held, the defendant was required to serve his first sentence first and before
beginning on his second sentence, and since the total time served in the penitentiary
exceeded the maximum time required to be served under the first sentence, the
prisoner was entitled to be discharged, subject however to the conditions of his
second parole.
III. THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL ACT
A prior six months' sentence in the city workhouse on a manslaughter con-
viction, imprisonment thereunder, and discharge upon compliance with the sentence,
was a sufficient prior crime on which to base a conviction under the Habitual
Criminal Act.42 The Second Offense Act, or Habitual Criminal Act, as it is more
commonly known, requires a prior conviction of an offense punishable by imprison-
ment in the penitentiary. Defendant had been convicted of a graded felony and
could have been punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary. The act does not
require that punishment actually assessed must have been imprisonment. Appar-
ently one fined upon a conviction of a charge, such as intoxicated driving, is there-
after subject to conviction under the Habitual Criminal Act since the crime is one
for which he might have been sent to the penitentiary.
43
IV. ENTIcING AWAY A CHILD
Of the cases decided by the court during the year 1940, none will find more
interest among the bar generally than the case of State v. Huhn,44 decided by the
40. 142 S. W. (2d) 670 (Mo. 1940).
41. Mo. Ray. STAT. (1929) § 12969.
42. State v. York, 142 S. W. (2d) 91 (Mo. 1940).
43. One convicted of an offense for which he might have been imprisoned in
the penitentiary is convicted of a felony even though the punishment inflicted on
him be only fine or jail sentence. State v. Woodson, 248 Mo. 705, 154 S. W. 705
(1913).
44. 346 Mo. 695, 142 S. W. (2d) 1064 (1940).
9
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court en banc. The appellant and the prosecuting witness were husband and wife.
They had lived together only a short while, and never for any length of time
after the birth of their child. The child had always lived with its mother in Mis-
souri, while the father resided in Kansas. Without the knowledge or consent of the
mother, the father went to the home of the wife's parents, where the child had
been left with the wife's sister and her husband. Over their objection, the father
took the child and carried it to his home in Kansas. He was convicted in the
circuit court of the felony of enticing away a child. Section 4416, Missouri Revised
Statutes 1939, the section under which defendant was convicted, provides: "Every
person who shall maliciously, forcibly or fraudulently lead, take or carry away
any child under twelve years, with the intent to detain or conceal said child from
its parent, guardian or other person having the lawful charge of such child, shall,
upon conviction, be punished, etc." If under the terms of Section 1526, Missouri
Revised Statutes 1939, the mother had exclusive custody and control, then the
defendant was guilty. The construction to be given that section then became the
issue in the case. That section provides: "The father and mother living apart are
entitled to an adjudication of the circuit court as to their powers, rights and duties
in respect to the custody and control and the services and earnings and manage-
ment of the property of their unmarried minor children without any preference as
between said father and mother, and neither the father nor the mother has any
right paramount to that of the other in respect to the custody and control or the
services and earnings or of the management of the property of their said unmarried
minor children, pending such adjudication the father or mother who actually has
the custody and control of said unmarried minor children shall have the sole right
to the custody and control . . . of said unmarried minor children." The court
divided over the construction to be given the words pending such adjudication. The
majority held that the words were limited to that period from the time a judicial
or court proceeding was brought or commenced until an adjudication was rendered;
and that there being no proceedings pending in the courts at the time the father
took the child, the mother did not have exclusive right to the child, and the father
was not therefore guilty of the charge, and reversed the conviction outright.
The minority opinion holds that the word pending should be given the mean-
ing of "while awaiting" or "until" an adjudication; that to give it the construction
contended for by the majority is to authorize the child to be shuttled back and
forth between his parents, the very situation the legislature was attempting to
avoid. We are of the opinion that the dissenting opinion of the minority is to be
preferred, but at least the matter has been determined and attorneys may now
advise their clients regarding their rights to the custody of their minor children
with definiteness.
LATNEY BARNES 4 5
45. Attorney, Mexico, Mo., A.B., Westminster College, 1930; LL.B., Univer-
sity of Missouri, 1935. Prosecuting attorney, -Audrain County, 1937-1941.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LIMITATIONS ON TREATY-MAKING POWER IN UNITED STATES,
CANADA Am AUSTRALIA
The acceptance of membership in the International Labor Organization by
the United States, a recent decision of the Judicial Committee of the British
Privy Council 2 and another by the High Court of Australian seem to justify
a reconsideration of the much weighed problem dealt with in Missouri v. Holand,4
namely the question of the extent to which the doctrine of the distribution of
powers in a federal system of government imposes limitations upon the treaty-
making power of the national government. Certainly the importance of the prob-
lem, at a time when the achievement of a lasting and just peace is the goal of
every effort, can hardy be overstated.
With respect to the making of treaties the Constitution of the United States
provides simply that: The President shall have the "power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur . . ."5 "This Constitution, and laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.
"6 And "no state shall enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation."'
Does it follow that the treaty-making power of the Federal Government
is unlimited? If not, what is the measure of the extent of that power? Or to
put the matter more specifically, does the federal treaty-making power cut across
the reserved power of the states?s
In partial answer to these questions it may be said that no federal treaty
has ever been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Moreover, there are a substantial number of early decisions upholding federal
treaties in fields which would normally be beyond the jurisdiction of Congress.
For example, treaty provisions regulating the tenure and descent of alien estates,
and the personal rights of alien residents have been upheld in the face of incon-
sistent state legislation, though these fields have otherwise always been recognized
as within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.9
On the other hand, dicta in a number of other early decisions may be cited
to the effect that there are limitations on the treaty-making power of the United
States. Thus, for example: "treaties to be valid, must be made within the scope
1. International Labor Office Document, C. P. 38 (Aug. 20, 1934).
2. Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario, (1937)
A. C. 326.
3. Rex v. Burgess, 55 C. L. R. 608 (1936).
4. 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
5. U. S. CONST. ART. II, § 2.
6. U. S. CONST. ART. VI.
7. U. S. CONST. ART. I, § 10.
8. U. S. CONST. ART. X.
9. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U. S. 199 (1796); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U. S. 259
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of the same powers (vested in Congress by the Constitution); for there can be
'no authority of the United States', save what is derived mediately or immediately,
and regularly and legitimately, from the Constitution. A treaty, no more than an
ordinary statute, can arbitrarily cede away one right of a State or any citizen
of a State."' 0
"The treaty is therefore a law made by the proper authority, and the courts
of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they
violate the Constitution of the United States.""
"It need hardly be said that a treaty can not change the Constitution or be
held valid if it be in violation of that instrument"1 2
"Whenever, therefore, an act of Congress would be unconstitutional, as invad-
ing the reserved rights of the states, a treaty to the same effect would be uncon-
stitutional." 2
The latest and leading decision on the problem is that rendered by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Missouri v. Holland.14 The back-
ground and facts of that case are as follows. Congressional legislation designed
to protect the migratory birds of the United States had been held an unconstitu-
tional violation of the reserved powers of the states in two lower federal courts.'15
An appeal to the Supreme Court from these decisions was taken, but the matter
was held up pending negotiation of a treaty between the United States and Great
Britain for the protection of migratory birds in Canada and the United States.
On December 8, 1916, such a treaty was proclaimed by the President. It provided
that each of the parties thereto was to propose to its law-making body, legislation
of a designated type for the protection of migratory birds. It is this ancillary
legislation (the provisions of which were substantially the same as that which
had been held invalid in the lower court decisions mentioned immediately above)
which came before the court in Missouri v. Holland. The Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Holmes, upheld the legislation in question with the following
remarks:
"It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitu-
tion, that there are limits therefore, to the treaty-making power, and that
one such limit is that what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in
derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do. An
earlier act in pursuance of a treaty to regulate the killing of migratory birds
within the United States has been held bad in the District Court. . . .
The same argument is supposed to apply now with equal force. Whether
the two cases cited were decided rightly or not, they cannot be accepted
as a test of the treaty power. Acts of Congress are the supreme law of
the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties
are declared to be so when they are made under the authority of the
United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the United
10. The License Cases, 5 Howard 504, 613 (U. S. 1847).
11. Doe v. Braden, 16 Howard 635 (U. S. 1853).
12. Cherokee Tobacco Case, 11 Wallace 616, 620 (U. S. 1870).
13. Prevost v. Greneaux, 19 Howard 1 (U. S. 1856).
14. 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
15. United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (E. D. Ark. 1914); United
States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan. 1915).
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States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention.
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-
making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is
obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national
well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty
followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in
matters requiring national action, 'a power which must belong to and
somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not to be found."
These are the latest words of the Supreme Court directly relating to the
problem here under consideration. But clearly the justices did not intend to go
any further than was actually necessary to dispose of the question before them.
For sixteen years the cryptic "We do not mean to imply that there are no
qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a
different way" remained unelucidated. But recent dicta in a case, although itself
not directly in point, seems to take up that remark and throw at least some
light upon it, as follows:
"The two classes of powers (those in respect to foreign or external
affairs and those in respect to domestic or internal affairs) are different,
both in respect of their origin and their nature. The broad statement
that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifical-
ly enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are neces-
sary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically
true only in respect of our internal affairs. In that field, the primary pur-
pose of the Constitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative
powers then possessed by the states such portions as it was thought
desirable to vest in the federal government, leaving those not included in
the enumeration still in the states. . . . That this doctrine applies only
to the powers that the states had is self-evident. And since the states
severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not have
been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted
to the United States from some other source. During the colonial period
those powers were possessed exclusively by and were entirely under the
control of the Crown. By the Declaration of Independence 'the Represen-
tatives of the United States of America' declared the United (not the
several) colonies to be free and independent states, and as such to have
'full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish
Commerce and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States
may of right do.'
"As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies acting
as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to
the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate
capacity as the United States of America."16
On August 20, 1934, the United States accepted membership in the Interna-
tional Labor Organization. Article 405, 5, of the constitution of that organization
provides that after a recommendation or draft convention has been adopted by
the I. L. 0., each member is bound to "bring (it) before the authority or authori-
ties within whose competence the matter lies, for the enactment of legislation or
other action."
Article 405, ff 9, provides that "in the case of a federal state, the power of
which to enter into conventions on labor matters is subject to limitations, it shall
16. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
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be in the discretion of that Government to treat a draft convention to which
such limitations apply as a recommendation only, and the provisions of this article
with respect to recommendations shall apply in such case."
The crucial question for present purposes is whether the United States is
a "federal state, the power of which to enter into conventions on labor matters
is subject to limitations." That is, may the United States treat a draft convention
as a recommendation only and submit it to the several states for appropriate leg-
islation? Or must a draft convention, whatever its subject matter, be brought
before Congress "for the enactment of legislation or other action"? There is, of
course, as yet no categorical answer.
Interestingly the Joint Resolution of Congress, approved by the President on
June 19, 1934, which provided for our membership in the I. L. 0., contained this
clause:
'Whereas special provision has been made in the constitution of the
International Labor Organization by which membership of the United
States would not impose or be deemed to impose any obligation or agree-
ment upon the United States to accept the proposals of that body as
involving anything more than recommendations for its consideration .... "1
In September, 1935, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations trans-
mitted to the Secretary of State of the United States five draft conventions and
one recommendation which had been adopted by the Conference at its nineteenth
session in June, 1935.28
In June, 1936, the President sent a message to Congress accompanied by
copies of the said draft conventions and recommendation "to which the attention
of the Congress was invited."' 91 It was apparently assumed that the entire matter
was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government, although the
draft conventions concerned the employment of women in underground work, the
hours of work in coal mines, the reduction of hours of work to forty a week, the
maintenance of rights under invalidity, old-age and widows' insurance, and the
reduction of hours of work in glass-bottle works. In any case the message and
the accompanying conventions and recommendation were referred to appropriate
committees in Congress and have not yet emerged.
In respect to the Government of Canada, the questions which have been
raised herein are complicated by the fact that Canada is a part of the British
Empire and yet for a number of years now has been attaining something in the
nature of an independent international status. Nevertheless, the answers to our
questions have been categorically stated in a series of judicial opinions.
The Canadian constitution, i.e., the British North American Act, provides in
Section 132 that:
"The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all powers
necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or any pro-
vince thereof, as part of the British Empire, towards foreign countries, aris-
ing under treaties between the Empire and such foreign countries."
17. 78 CONG. REC. 12359, 11681, 12362 (1934).
18. United States Treaty Information, Bulletin No. 73, p. 15 (Oct. 1935).
19. 80 CONG. REc. 9925, 9999 (1936).
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It has been held in unmistakable terms that Canadian, i.e., federal, legislation
enacted to effectuate the terms of an Empire treaty was valid and must supercede
conflicting provincial legislation in a field in which the absence of such a treaty
the provinces would have exclusive jurisdiction. See, for example, The King v.
Stuart,20 which sustained the validity of Canadian legislation enacted pursuant
to the Migratory Birds Convention of 1916 between Great Britain and the United
States.
But what of legislation enacted to effectuate treaties made by Canada inde-
pendently of the Empire?
Canadian constituional history on this point has been interesting. Although
the matter was not squarely at issue in the Aeronautics Case,21 because an Empire
treaty was involved, the opinion contained dicta to the effect that jurisdiction to
legislate for the purpose of performing the obligations of any Canadian treaty
rqsided exclusively in the Parliament of Canada.
In the Radio Case,22 a convention which had been entered into by Canada
independently of the Empire was involved and the legislation passed pursuant to
the terms thereof was upheld.
I As a result of these two decisions it was felt in many quarters that the dicta
in the earlier opinion constituted an accurate statement of the law.
This, however, proved to be incorrect. In the "depression" years the Canadian
Parliament enacted into law a series of bills designed to put into effect some Inter-
national Labor Organization Conventions to which Canada was a party inde-
pendently of the Empire. The subject matter of the Conventions was clearly
within the powers conferred by Section 92 of the British North American Act
exclusively upon the Legislatures of the provinces.23 In passing upon the validity
of the legislation in question the Privy Council in the case of Attorney General for
Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario,2 4 brushed the Aeronautics Case aside on
the ground the dicta therein was purely obiter and the Radio Case on the ground
that the convention there involved a subject matter which was not included in the
powers reserved by Section 92 exclusively to the provinces, but rather fell within
the general residuary powers of the Federal Government. Not, therefore, being
restrained by the doctrine of stare decises the Privy Council proceeded to hold
the legislation invalid on the ground that:
"For the purposes of §§ 91 and 92, i.e., the distribution of legislative
powers between the Dominion and the Provinces, there is no such thing
as treaty legislation as such. The distribution is based on classes of sub-jects; and as a treaty deals with a particular class of subjects so will the
legislative power of performing it be ascertained. . . . It follows from
what has been said that no further legislative competence is obtained by
20. (1925) 1 D. L. R. 12.
21. (1932) A. C. 54.
22. (1932) A. C. 304.
23. Section 92 provides in part: "In each province the legislature may ex-
clusively make laws in relation to matters coming within the class of subjects next
hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, . . . (13) property and civil rights
in the province."
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the Dominion from its accession to international status, and the consequent
increase in the scope of its executive functions . ... In other words,
the Dominion cannot, merely by making promises to foreign countries,
clothe itself with legislative authority inconsistent with the constitution
which gave it birth.
It is interesting that no reference whatsoever was made to Missouri v. Holland,
either by the court or by counsel in their argument.
With respect to the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia the ques-
tion here under discussion was raised and apparently settled in 1936 in the
Aviation Case.25 That case involved the validity of certain administrative regula-
tions issued pursuant to a commonwealth statute, which, though intended to effect
the purposes of the International Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Naviga-
tion of 1914, did not in fact accord precisely with the provisions of that Conven-
tion. The regulations being clearly beyond the ambit of the Commonwealth's
jurisdiction in the absence of a Convention, the discussion by the members of
the court in their decision could only have been predicated upon the assumption
that, had the regulations and the statute upon which they were predicated in fact
conformed with the Convention, they would have been valid. Three of the judges
in their separate opinions were vague on the matter, but Evatt and McTieman, JJ.,
had this to say:
"It is true that such subject matters as air navigation, the manufacture
of munitions, the suppression of the drug traffic and standard hours of
work in industry are not made express or separate subject matters of
Commonwealth legislative power. But there is, in our view, an undoubted
capacity in His Majesty to enter into international conventions dealing
with any of these subject matters and necessarily binding upon and in
respect of the Commonwealth. In truth, the King's power to enter into
international conventions cannot be limited in advance of the international
situations which may from time to time arise. And in our view the fact
of an international convention having been duly made about a subject
brings that subject within the field of international relations so far as such
subject is dealt with by the agreement Accordingly (to pursue the illustra-
tion) Australia is not 'a federal State the power of which to enter into
conventions on labour matters is subject to limitations.' A contrary view
has apparently governed the practice of the Commonwealth authorities in
relation to the ratification of the draft conventions of the International
Labour Office. In our opinion such view is wrong. "126
In summary it may be said that of the three constitutions considered, only
that of Canada contains an express provision in respect to the relationship between
the treaty-making power of the federal government and the exclusive reserved
powers of its constituent member states, but that provision relates only to Empire
treaties. With respect to treaties to which Canada is a party independently of
the Empire, no express constitutional provision has been made and the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council has held that Canada has no power to enact
legislation to put into effect a treaty the subject matter of which is within the
exclusive, reserved powers of the provinces.
25. Rex. v. Burgess, 55 C. L. R. 608 (1936).
26. Id. at 681.
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On the other hand, in the absence of express constitutional provisions, the
highest courts of the United States and Australia have rendered decisions which
make it all but certain that the federal legislatures of those nations can legislate
to carry out the provisions of any treaty to which they are parties, regardless of
the subject matter involved.
The latter conclusion, it is submitted, is preferable to that reached with
respect to Canada, because as a practical matter it would be extremely difficult
in any of the three nations to secure uniform legislation in all of its constituent
member states for the purpose of carrying out a federal treaty-the net result
being that the treaty-making power of a federal government in which such member
state concurrence was necessary would in practice be severely limited.
WALLACE MENDELSON
2 7
EVIDENCE-LAYMEN'S OPINIONS AS TO SANITY OR INSANITY
The opinion rule, in its American development, is an offspring of the rule
requiring that a witness speak from first hand knowledge. The early cases excluding
"mere opinion" meant a belief by a witness who had no personal knowledge of the
subject about which he was called to speak. When an ordinary witness came
properly equipped with facts gained through personal observation the early judges
did not exclude the opinion and inferences he drew therefrom. It was only opinion
based on guess or a belief without observation which was rejected. The "mere
opinion" of an expert witness who had no personal knowledge was admitted as a
necessary exception because the jury could really be aided by the expert's opinion.
The test for the skilled witness was whether the jury could be aided by a person
of skill in the particular subject. In the United States this test was extended to the
lay witness who came equipped with personal knowledge of the facts, since it could
be argued that the jury now in possession of the facts were as able as the witness
to draw the inferences. This extension is an American doctrine and apparently
has not taken place in England.1
The later and changed theory is, then, that of exclusion of superfluous evidence.
2
Wigmore says that "the opinion rule, in its simplest form, is this: Where the data
observed can be exactly and fully reproduced by the witness so that the jury
can equally well draw any inference from them, the witness' opinion is not wanted,
and will be excluded." 3 Conversely, the opinion is received whenever the facts
cannot be so detailed as to make the jury as able as the witness to draw the infer-
ence. It is often said, however, that a witness must testify to facts of which he
27. Instructor in Political Science, University of Illinois. B.A. 1933, Ph.D.,
1940, University of Wisconsin; LL.B. 1936, Harvard.
1. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 1917, 1918.
2. Ibid.
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has knowledge and cannot give his opinion thereon. That is, the opinion rule is
sometimes based upon the supposition that there exists a clear distinction between
"fact" and "opinion." This is unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.
Every verbal description has in it a large measure of inference beyond the mere
statement of sense impressions, and the difference between fact and opinion is
one of degree. That which is admitted by courts is not always "fact" but often
"opinion." The attempt to draw such a distinction causes much quibbling and
waste of time.
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the admissibility of lay opinions as to
sanity or insanity. There was never any question as to the admissibility of such
evidence in England,4 but the question was argued in almost every court in the
United States.5 However, it is now held in all but a few jurisdictions that such
lay opinions are admissible, "subject to local qualifications and quibbles." 6
In Lee v. Ullery,7 a will contest, the contestant called lay witnesses who
were permitted to testify that they had known the testator over a period of years;
that they had seen him frequently during the last few years of his life; that during
the last few months of his life, and prior to the execution of the will, they had
noticed a change in his mental condition. These witnesses testified that, in
their opinion, the testator was insane at and before the date of the execution
of the will. Some of them stated no facts as a basis for their opinion and others
stated facts after expressing an opinion that the testator was insane. The Supreme
Court of Missouri held that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting
the lay witnesses to give their opinions that the testator was insane without first
detailing the facts on which they were based. The opinion in this case declares
that the supreme court has consistently made two specific requirements as a con-
dition precedent to the admission of lay opinions as to the insanity or mental
incompetency of a person whose mental condition is under consideration. "They are
(1) that the witness has had an opportunity to observe, and know the mental
condition of such person, (the extent of such opportunity, except for sufficient
acquaintance to qualify, going to the weight and value of the witness' testimony),
and, (2) that the witness shall first state the facts upon which such opinion is
based, and unless such facts as stated by the witness are inconsistent with sanity
and mental competency, the witness shall not give such opinion." s
The first requirement laid down by the court is merely a recognition of an
otherwise established general principle of testimonial qualification that a witness, to
be competent at all, must have had opportunity to use his senses in personal
observation of the matter about which he testifies.9 This requirement eliminates
4. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1933.
5. See cases in note 16, infra.
6. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1938.
7. 346 Mo. 236, 140 S. W. (2d) 5 (1940).
8. 346 Mo. 236, 248, 140 S. W. (2d) 5, 12 (1940).
9. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 657.
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testimony based on guess, hearsay, and imagination. All courts agree that a non-
expert is confined to opinions on facts within his own knowledge.10
The second requirement is difficult to justify and did not exist under the
original orthodox practice. As has been stated, the original objection to opinion
was that "mere opinion" lacked the support of personal knowledge. Thus all that
should be required before the opinion of a non-expert is received is a showing
that the witness had an opportunity to observe and did observe the person whose
sanity is in question. This view has been taken by some courts." In a number of
jurisdictions,' 2 hbwever, the modern doctrine"2 has been confused with the earlier
one, and it has been laid down as a fixed rule that the observed facts must accom-
pany or precede the opinion. Lee v. Ullery' 4 holds that the statement of facts
must precede the opinion.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that a lay witness who has observed
the conduct, demeanor or appearance of a person may describe the same in general
terms without first detailing the facts upon which it is based. Thus he may give his
opinion as to the ability of a person to do manual labor; he may testify as to the
existence of emotions, such as anger and hate; or his opinion may relate to the
apparent health of a person, or to changes in a person's appearance and activity.
When the opinion rule has been urged as an objection to such testimony the supreme
court has said that the testimony is received because the facts, which constitute the
cause from which the opinion proceeds as an effect, cannot themselves be ade-
quately communicated to the jurors, so as to impart to them the knowledge which
the witness actually possesses. These Missouri decisions are sound and reflect
10. The opinion of an expert witness may be based upon hypothetical data
alone; it is immaterial whether he has ever observed the data upon which his opin-
ion is to be based. Of course an expert may also base his opinion on facts within
his personal knowledge. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 677, 678. The subject of expert
witnesses is beyond the scope of this discussion.
11. Brown v. Commonwealth, 14 Bush (77 Ky.) 398 (1878); Wood v. State,
58 Miss. 74 (1881); Territory v. Hart, 7 Mont. 489, 17 Pac. 718 (1888) semble;
State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241 (1889), citing Baldwin v. State, 12 Mo.
223 (1848); Territory v. Roberts, 9 Mont. 12, 22 Pac. 132 (1889) semble; Chicago
Union Traction Co. v. Lawrence, 211 Ill. 373, 71 N. E. 1024 (1904) semble; State v.
Rumble, 81 Kan. 16, 105 Pac. 1 (1909); Mays v. Mays, 263 Ky. 546, 92 S. W. (2d)
827 (1936) semble (but the court says the opinion will have little weight unless
the witness states the facts observed); see also Clary v. Clary, 2 Iredell (N. C.) 62
(1841); Garrison v. Blanton, 48 Tex. 299 (1877); Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 115,
72 S. E. 922 (1911).
California has a statute which provides that only intimate acquaintances of the
person in question can give an opinion as to sanity. Under this statute the Cali-
fornia court has held that it is not necessary that the witness state facts before giving
an opinion as to insanity. This court says that the existence of a sound factual
basis for the opinion is adequately tested by cross-examination and is not a matter
of qualifying the witness to give his opinion. People v. McCarthy, 115 Cal. 255,
46 Pac. 1073 (1896); People v. Manoogian, 141 Cal. 592, 75 Pac. 177 (1904).
12. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1935, 1938. See WEIHOFEN, INSANITY As A DE-
FENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW (1933) p. 233.
13. Notes 2 and 3, supra.
14. Note 7, supra.
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an understanding of the true theory of the opinion rule. In Lee v. Ullery the
supreme court cited these decisions with apparent approval 5 but said that they
do not support the view that a lay witness to insanity need not state the facts
upon which his opinion rests. This may be questioned because the reason for
receiving lay opinions as to insanity and mental incompetency is precisely the same
as that for receiving lay opinions as to observed physical conditions, emotions, and
the like, namely, that the observed data cannot be so detailed as to make the jurors
as able as the witness to draw the inferences. 16
The argument is thus stated by the Supreme Court of Alabama: "Does not
even a casual observer of mental phenomena fully recognize the impossibility
15. 346 Mo. 236, 140 S. W. (2d) 5, 12 (1940).
16. One of the better reasoned early cases that admitted such lay opinions
was Clary v. Clary, 2 Iredell (N. C.) 62 (1841). It is impossible, says this court,
for a witness to relate the facts on which his opinion is based with sufficient clarity
and detail to enable the jury to form its own opinion with reasonable assurance
of correctness. It is impossible even to state facts without giving some opinion.
The one requirement for such opinion is that the witness must have had sufficient
opportunity to observe. It is thus expressed by the court (p. 65), "Mere opinion
as such is not admissible. But where it is shown that the witness has had an
opportunity of observing.. ., then his judgment or belief, framed on suck observa-
tion, is evidence for the consideration of the jury; and it is for them to give to this
evidence that weight, which the intelligence of the witness, his means of observa-
tion, and all the other circumstances attending his testimony, may in their judg-
ment deserve."
In Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120 (1841), the court rejected such lay
opinion but Doe, J., dissented on the ground that it was impossible for the witness
to give an adequate picture of the situation by merely stating facts that he had
observed. He compares this to cases of identity, handwriting, age, form, size, weight,
measure, strength, speed, time, distance, heat, cold, quality, quantity, number,
etc. He says that the witness should state enough facts to show that he had means
of forming an opinion but indicates that opportunity for observing is enough to
qualify the witness and whether he should state all of the observed facts before he
gives his opinion should be within the discretion of the trial court. Doe, J., again
dissented in State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 412 (1870), where he argued that a lay
opinion as to insanity is admissible and that the general circumstances under which
it was formed and the facts observed go to its weight The logic of Judge Doe's
argument prevailed and in the case of Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227 (1875), the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire admitted lay opinion on insanity. See also State
v. Hause, 82 N. H. 133, 130 Atl. 743 (1925), which says that if the witness has
such knowledge that his opinion will be helpful to the jury, that opinion may proper-
ly be admitted in evidence and no requirements as to facts preceding the opinion
are made.
Other early cases admit such opinions for the same reason. Norris v. State, 16
Ala. 775, 780 (1849); Kelly v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555, 601 (1855); Beaubien v.
Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459, 503 (1864); Clark v. State, 12 Ohio 483 (1843); Wood v.
State, 58 Miss. 741 (1881); Brown v. Commonwealth, 14 Bush (77 Ky.) 398, 405
(1878). Thus we see that because the witness is unable adequately to state the facts
that show insanity, the courts in the early cases received lay opinion as to insanity.
However, in the general statement of this rule the courts have often said that the
witness must first state the facts upon which his opinion is to bp based. It is sug-
gested that with many of these courts this is simply loose language. When these
courts come to consider this precise point they often say that a recital by the wit-
ness of long and perhaps intimate association with the person under consideration
is a sufficient statement of the facts. See also cases in note 11, supra.
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of communicating to another the facts, and almost numberless minute circumstances,
indicating a morbid action of the brain and consequent mental aberration, the main
force of which may consist in some peculiar characteristic, which none but the
observer can fully appreciate? . . . Must the prisoner lose the benefit of such
testimony altogether, or shall the witness be required to furnish as well as he may,
a pantomimic delineation of the wild look, the vacant stare, the unnatural gait, the
distorted countenance, the idiotic laugh, as well as the numberless caprices and
sudden and apparently causeless exhibitions of joy and sorrow? Were such the law,
the force of the testimony would be made to depend upon the powers of the witness
for imitation."lr The Supreme Court of Texas has said: "A witness may state, with
much certainty, that one, with whom he has associated has become insane; and yet
he cannot clearly explain to others, how it is, that he knows the individual in
question to be insane."1s
The Missouri cases hold that in order to testify that a person is sane the lay
witness is not required to give the facts upon which the opinion is based.1 The
reason for this distinction seems to be that sanity is the normal condition and does
not attract special attention, whereas insanity is the unusual condition and the
facts evidencing it stand out and can be described. But as stated, in many cases
of insanity the facts evidencing the person's condition do not stand out so that
they can be exactly and fully described. Some of the witnesses in Lee v. Ullery20
testified that, in their opinion, the testator was insane, and that they could not
better explain his condition, because that was the only way they knew of describing
the change in the testator's condition. It seems inconsistent for a court to hold
that the opinions of lay witnesses to insanity are admissible because the witnesses
cannot give an adequate description of the observed appearances which indicate
insanity and at the same time to hold that their opinions must be preceded by
a recital of the data on which they are based-"thus in effect compelling the witness
to do the very thing which it has just been assured they cannot do, and imposing
on them the very difficulty, the necessity of obviating which, was made a ground,
and the principal ground, of establishing this exception to the general rule of
evidence." 21
The leading authority on evidence says that justification for the requirement
under discussion "seems never to have been attempted; it is simply an instance of
traditions misunderstood." 22 In Lee v. Ullery, however, the supreme court seems
to rest the rule upon the theory that a witness' opinion is entitled to no greater
17. Chilton, J., in Norris v. State, 16 Ala. 775, 779 (1849).
18. Bell, J., in Cooper v. State, 23 Tex. 331, 338 (1859).
19. These cases are cited in Lee v. Ullery, 346 Mo. 236, 245, 140 S. W. (2d)
5, 10 (1940).
20. Note 7, supra.
21. Sargent, J., speaking for the majority in Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H.
120, 133 (1866). This argument was advanced to support the holding that lay
opinions to insanity are inadmissible. But the dissenting opinions of Doe, J., finally
prevailed in New Hampshire. See note 16, supra.
22. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1922, p. 20.
21
et al.: Comments
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weight than the facts which form its basis. Hence the witness must state in detail
what he saw that led him to the conclusion that the person was insane, and must
satisfy the trial judge that the facts detailed afford a reasonable basis for the
opinion. If the witness is unable to state any facts, or if the trial judge believes
that the facts stated are not "inconsistent with sanity and mental competency,"
the witness will not be permitted to give his opinion. Further it is said that the
purpose of this requirement is to provide a standard by which the value of an
opinion may be tested by the trial judge.2 3 It is believed that these expressions
illustrate the fallacy of the rule.
If it has been shown that the lay witness had a reasonable opportunity to
observe and did observe the person in question, the facts upon which his opinion
is based are matters affecting its weight (as the court said) but seemingly have
nothing to do with admissibility.24 Questions concerning the admissibility of evi-
dence are distinct from those which affect its weight.25 In Lee v. Ullery the court
says that evidence of sickness, old age, forgetfulness, eccentricities, inability to
recognize friends, and the like, is not inconsistent with testamentary capacity,
and argues that the requirement under discussion is necessary to protect the jurors
against lay opinions based upon facts which have "no direct bearing" upon testa-
mentary capacity. But most of the cases cited 28 in support of this argument
merely hold that sickness, old age, and eccentricities, are not "sufficient in them-
selves" to overthrow a will on the ground of mental incapacity, but each of these
may be taken into consideration with other facts in determining whether the testator
had such mental capacity as the law requires. In these cases the court was not
concerned with error in the admission of such evidence, but only its sufficiency when
the question was raised by a demurrer to the evidence. Although sickness, old age,
and eccentricities may not justify a conclusion that the person was mentally incom-
petent, the witness may have observed other facts which justify such a conclusion
but which he cannot adequately describe. No doubt the facts should be given
whenever possible, for the correct view is more likely to be obtained by the jury
if all of the facts upon which the opinion is based are before the jury. It is be-
lieved, however, that no harm could be done by letting the witness give his opinion
without first detailing the facts upon which it is based. When the opinion is
admitted, it usually carries little weight unless it appears to be based on adequate
data. The grounds of the opinion can be elicited on cross-examination to affect
its weight.2 If it appears on cross-examination that the witness' opinion is based
23. 346 Mo. 236, 245, 140 S. W. (2d) 5, 10 (1940). While the court said that
this is the rule "in this type of case," the language of the opinion indicates that the
requirement would be enforced in any case involving the mental competency of a
person.
24. See cases in notes 11 and 16, supra.
25. 1 WIGMORE, EVMENCE §§ 12, 29.
26. See 346 Mo. 236, 245, 140 S. W. (2d) 5, 10 (1940). See also Proffer v.
Proffer, 342 Mo. 184, 114 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1938).
27. Chalmers, J., in Wood v. State, 58 Miss. 741, 743 (1881): "The qualifica-
tion that the opinion of the non-expert must be accompanied by a statement of the
facts upon which it is based, is not very important, since, whether the witness be
1942] COMMENTS
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solely upon such data as sickness, old age or eccentricities, the court can direct
a verdict if this is the only evidence offered to show testamentary incapacity.
The Missouri rule not only requires the witness to state in detail what he saw
that led him to the conclusion that the witness was mentally incompetent, but he
must also satisfy the trial judge that what he observed was "inconsistent with
sanity and mental competency." This seems to mean that the trial judge must
be satisfied that the witness observed "facts" from which reasonable men may,
independent of the witness' opinion, infer mental incompetency. However, as we
have seen, such opinions are admitted because the data observed by the witness
cannot be portrayed so that the jury is put in an equal position with the witness
to draw inferences. Since the jury is not asked to decide the question independent
of the opinion of the witness, it is hard to see why the witness should be required
to state facts from which mental incompetency may be infered independent of
his opinion. These objections to the rule under discussion have been pointed out
by several courts.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has said: "Exactly what is meant by the
expression in some cases, when such evidence has been admitted, that 'the witness
must detail the facts upon which the opinion is based', we do not find explained.
If the admissibility of the opinion as evidence must depend upon the facts from
which it is formed, it is manifest that there is a question for the court antecedent
to its introduction, and that to promulgate a general rule, as to the amount and
quality of the evidence that should satisfy the court in every case, would be im-
possible. . . . It is not intended that the admissibility of the evidence shall be
made to depend upon the ability of the witness to state specific facts, from which
the jury may, independent of the opinion of the witness, draw a conclusion of
sanity or insanity, for it is the competency of the opinion of the witness that is the
subject of inquiry. The ability of the witness to detail certain facts . . . of the
mind, may add very greatly to the weight of the opinion given in evidence, but
they will not of necessity affect the question of competency.1 28
It may be noted that even if the witness states facts inconsistent with sanity
and mental competency, the witness, whether expert or non-expert, will not be
permitted to say whether the testator was "capable of understanding a business
transaction" or whether he was "mentally competent to make a will," but only to
say whether he was of sound or unsound mind.29 The reason is that the deter-
mination of the existence of testamentary capacity involves the application of a legal
definition to the factual data of mental condition and the witness' opinion expressed
expert or non-expert, the grounds of his belief may be elicited; . . ." See also cases in
notes 11 and 16, supra.
28. Hines, J., in Brown v. Commonwealth, 14 Bush (77 Ky.) 398, 405 (1878),
quoted in 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1922, p. 20. See also remarks of Roberts, C. J.,
in Garrison v. Blanton, 48 Tex. 299, 303 (1877).
29. Farrell's Adm'r v. Brennan's Adm'x, 32 Mo. 328 (1862); Post v. Bailey,
254 S. W. 71 (Mo. 1923); Fields v. Luck, 327 Mo. 113, 44 S. W. (2d) 18 (1931);
cf. Heinbach v. Heinbach, 274 Mo. 301, 202 S. W. 1123 (1918) (whether testator
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in this form, leaves it uncertain whether he is applying his own, or the laws' standard
of required capacity. A substantial number of courts have taken this view.30 Such
rulings seem to exclude the most useful answers and admit the least useful. The
ordinary witness has no desire to state a legal definition. An opinion as to the
mental capacity of a person to make a will or a deed or a contract is simply the
witness' way of describing the persons' general capacity to take care of himself
and his property, and when this is the case it would seem as if the opinion should
be admitted.
There is apparently one exception where the facts upon which the opinion
is based need not be given in testimony concerning insanity and that is the case of
the attesting witness.3'
It would seem that the law should require no more of the lay witness to
insanity than of witnesses generally, 32 namely, a preliminary showing that he has
had a reasonable opportunity from observation to acquire first-hand knowledge.
As indicated above, a number of courts have taken this view.33 The opinion rule, as
applied by the American courts, has been condemned by eminent judges.3 4 Wigmore
has predicted that it will some day be abolished by legislation. Certainly, the rules
of evidence in this regard might be relaxed with advantage.
FRED L. HowARD
INSURANCE-PROvISIONs AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES IN FIRE AND THEFT POLICIES
Many insurance policies, especially those covering personal property, contain
the provision that should the subject of insurance become encumbered by a chat-
tel mortgage, the policy is void. Underwriters realize that any decrease in the
value or extent of the interest insured will tend directly to increase the moral risk.
For one thing, the owner of insured property encumbered by a mortgage is tempted
to transform his encumbered property into unencumbered insurance money, since
the lien on the property does not attach to the proceeds of insurance on that
property. Also, since his property is so encumbered, the owner may have less in-
terest in watching and guarding it. So that the insured shall have no greater
motive to destroy, or less interest in watching and guarding the property insured,
these stipulations against encumbrances have been used.
The advent of such provisions is due largely to the inadequacy of previous
clauses which had been used as an attempt to protect against this danger of in-
creased moral risk.' Policies have long contained provisions that the ownership
30. 7 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1958.
31. Fields v. Luck, 335 Mo. 765, 74 S. W. (2d) 35 (1934).
32. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 650 et seq.
33. Note 11, supra.
34. See remarks of L. Hand, J., in United States v. Cotter, 60 F. (2d) 689,
693 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932).
1. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) § 189.
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of the insured be unconditional and sole. But it has been settled that the existence
of a mortgage or other encumbrance does not constitute a breach of this con-
dition.2 The same is true as regards the condition that there be no change in the
interest, title, or possession of the insured. The first form of this condition was
one prohibiting the sale or alienation of the property. This was construed, however,
to cover only a complete sale or alienation and so long as any interest whatsoever
remained in the insured, it was not broken.3 Due to this inadequacy, the under-
writers then added a prohibition against "any change of title." But in applying
the rule of strict construction against the insurer, the courts held that this applied
only to voluntary changes in title and not to any changes which might have taken
place in the owner's interest 4 To obtain the broadest protection possible, the
insurers then used the expression "any change in interest, title, or possession."
Although "interest" is the broadest property term which can be used, the decided
cases are in considerable conflict as to whether the giving of a mortgage amounts
to a change of interest Some cases have held that it does amount to a change of
interest and therefore avoids the policy unless consented to by the insurer.6 But
the weight of authority has held that the giving of a deed of trust or mortgage
is not such a substantial change in the interest of the insured as to constitute a
brdach of the condition. 6 So, the need for a provision that would unequivocably
cover mortgages and other encumbrances was clearly evident
The provisions against mortgages and other encumbrances in fire and theft
2. Royal Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 35 F. (2d) 916 (C. C. A. 4, 1930); Westchester
Fire Ins. Co. v. Green, 223 Ala. 121, 134 So. 881 (1931); Bankers' Fire Ins. Co.
v. Williams, 176 Ark. 1188, 5 S. W. (2d) 916 (1928); Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v.
Shahan, 48 Ga. App. 181, 167 S. E. 194 (1932); Sterling Fire Ins. Co. v. Comision
Reguladora, 195 Ind. 29, 143 N. E. 2 (1924); Collins v. Manufacturers Ins. Co.,
184 Iowa 747, 169 N. W. 199 (1918); Ornatowski v. National Liberty Ins. Co.,
290 Mich. 241, 287 N. W. 449 (1939); Lloyd v. North British Ins. Co., 174 App.
Div. 371, 161 N. Y. Supp. 271 (1916); Pease v. Traveler's Fire Ins. Co., 185 Okla.
421, 93 P. (2d) 536 (1939); Dunsmore v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 86, 149
Atl. 163 (1930); Hughes v. Insurance Co., 147 Tenn. 164, 246 S. W. 23 (1922);
Pauly v. Sun Ins. Office, 79 W. Va. 187, 90 S. E. 552 (1916); Koch v. Trans-
continental Ins. Co., 269 N. W. 539 (Wis. 1936).
3. Cowan v. Insurance Co., 40 Iowa 551, 20 Am. Rep. 583 (1875); Hitch-
cock v. Insurance Co., 26 N. Y. 68 (1862); Hoffman v. Insurance Co., 32 N. Y.
405, 88 Am. Dec. 337 (1865); Stetson v. Insurance Co., 4 Mass. 330, 3 Am. Dec.
217 (1808); Clinton v. Insurance Co., 176 Mass. 486, 57 N. E. 998 (1900).
4. Thompson v. Insurance-Co., 136 U. S. 287 (1890); Rhode Island Under-
writer's Ass'n v. Monarch, 98 Ky. 305, 32 S. W. 959 (1895); New Orleans Ins. Co.
v. Gordon, 68 Tex. 144, 3 S. W. 718 (1887); Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Bartlett,
91 Va. 305, 21 S. E. 476 (1895).
5. East Texas Fire Ins. Co v. Clarke, 79 Tex. 23, 15 S. W. 166 (1890);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Barker, 6 Colo. App. 535, 41 P. 513 (1895); Olney
v. Insurance Co., 88 Mich. 94, 50 N. W. 100 (1891); Watson v. Insurance Co.,
159 N. C. 638, 75 S. E. 1105 (1912); Modlin v. Insurance Co., 151 N. C. 35,
65 S. E. 605 (1909).
6. Wolf v. Insurance Co., 115 Wis. 402, 91 N. W. 1014 (1902). See also, to
the same effect, Sun. Fire Office v. Clark, 53 Ohio St. 414, 42 N. E. 248 (1895);
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policies have been held to be reasonable 7 and not against public policy or illegal.8
The great weight of authority has held them to be valid stipulations, the breach
of which constitutes a complete defense.9 Such a stipulation contained in the by-
laws of a mutual insurance company has also been held to void the policy if
breached.' ° As to whether the breach of this provision completely voids the policy
or merely makes it voidable for the period of encumbrance, the authorities are
not in accord. The majority of courts seem to hold the entire policy void when
the stipulation is breached. 1 It has been held, however, that a breach of the
provision only temporarily suspends the insurance and doesn't forfeit the rights
under the policy.'2
Although provisions differ to some extent, most policies say that any en-
cumbrance on the insured property without the written consent of the insurer will
void the policy. Courts have adhered very strictly to this consent requirement
saying that consent, in the form stipulated in the policy, is necessary to permit
an encumbrance on the property without breaching the condition.' Notice of
the mortgage to the soliciting agent doesn't bind the insurers.' 4 Even where a
mortgage is executed in order to use the proceeds to pay off a previous mortgage
known to the insurer, consent to the subsequent mortgage is necessary.' 5
7. Union Assur. Soc., Ltd. v. Reneer, 86 Ind. App. 240, 156 N. E. 833 (1927).
8. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Mullins, 218 Ky. 473, 291 S. W. 760 (1927).
9. Sun Ins. Office v. Scott, 284 U. S. 177 (1931); Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
v. Jones, 31 Ariz. 8, 250 Pac. 248 (1926); Butler v. Security Ins. Co., 244 I11. App.
379 (1928); Hoover v. First American Fire Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 559, 255 N. W.
705 (1934); Greco v. Continental Ins. Co., 219 Iowa 150, 291 S. W. 760 (1934);
Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Mullins, 218 Ky. 473, 291 S. W. 760 (1927); Couch v.
Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co., 220 Ky. 802, 295 S. W. 1054 (1927); Corey v.
Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 243 Ky. 34, 47 8. W. (2d) 955 (1932); Boley v. Banker's
& Shipper's Ins. Co., 23 S. W. (2d) 1095 (Mo. 1929); Williams v. Connecticut
Fire Ins. Co., 47 S. W. (2d) 207 (Mo. 1932).
10. Kennedy v. Farmer's Alliance Ins. Co., 127 Kan. 768, 275 Pac. 214 (1929);
Loehner v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., 17 Mo. 247 (1852).
11. Butler v. Security Ins. Co., 244 Ill. App. 379 (1928); Hoover v. First
American Fire Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 559, 255 N. W. 705 (1934); Greco v. Con-
tinental Ins. Co., 219 Iowa 150, 257 N. W. 210 (1934); Ransom v. Potomac Ins.
Co., 226 Mo. App. 664, 45 S. W. (2d) 95 (1932).
12. Hargett v. Gulf Ins. Co., 55 P. (2d) 1258 (Cal. App. 1936); Inventasch
v. Superior Fire Ins. Co., 48 R. I. 321, 138 At. 39 (1927).
"Under such a provision the placing of a mortgage on plaintiff's automobile
subsequent to the issuance of the policy and without knowledge or consent of the
defendant would not render the policy void; it would merely relieve the insurer
of liability for any loss or damage which might occur during the existence of
such mortgage. Immediately upon the release of such mortgage, if affected during
the term of the policy, the insurer's liability for loss or damage to the automobile
would again attach." Bridgewater v. General Exchange Ins. Corp., 131 S. W. (2d)
220 (Mo. 1939).
13. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. McChord, 24 F. (2d) 491 (1928); Niagara Fire
Ins. Co. v. Mullins, 218 Ky. 473, 291 S. W. 760 (1927); Corey v. Niagara Fire
Ins. Co., 243 Ky. 34, 47 S. W. (2d) 955 (1932).
14. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. McChord, 24 F. (2d) ,491 (1928); Hargett v.
Gulf Ins. Co., 55 P. (2d) 1258 (Cal. App. 1936).
15. Dresher v. London & Lanchaster Ins. Co., Ltd., 153 Wash. 635, 280 Pac.
57 (1929).
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Occasionally the problem arises as to just what constitutes an encumbrance
under the provision in question. "Encumbrance" has been defined as a burden
or charge on the property, and a "lien" has been defined as a charge on property
for the payment of a debt or duty.16 Following the rule of liberal construction
against the insurer, some courts have held that the provision against encumbrance
is not violated unless the transaction complained of is technically a mortgage;
that a lien of some other character is not sufficient." It would seem that since
the purpose of the stipulation is to reduce the moral hazard involved, there should
be no recovery even though the mortgage complained of is invalid. However, there
is authority holding that the insurance is not affected unless the mortgage is valid.""
Neither will the case where the mortgage debt has been paid, but the mortgage
not released, be one where the condition is deemed to be broken.' 9 And in a recent
Missouri case,20 a chattel mortgage, unknown to the named mortgagee, executed
without consideration, and covering no debt, was found not to be an encumbrance.
On the other hand, it has been held that a chattel mortgage is an encumbrance
vitiating the policy, even though not verified nor deposited for record.2' The
cases on this point, as can be seen, are in confusion; and needlessly so, it seems,
as the real criteria should be whether or not the moral hazard has been increased.
A mortgage valid on its face, but invalid in fact, could easily operate to increase
the moral risk, and if so, should be held to breach the clause against encumbrances.
In at least one case, the court intimated that the execution of a mortgage exceeding
that which theretofore encumbered the property is a prima fade violation of
the provision.2 2 Conversely, the transfer of a note already recognized in a loss-
payable clause is not an encumbrance which will void the policy.2
3
This encumbrance clause is clearly breached when the property is validly mort-
gaged after the issuance of the policy, and also when there is a valid mortgage
at the time of the issuance of the policy. 24 Accordingly, there is a duty on the
16. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones, 31 Ariz. 8, 250 Pac. 248 (1926).
17. Caplis v. Insurance Co., 60 Minn. 376, 62 N. W. 440 (1895). A deed of
trust on insured personalty has been held not to violatd the condition against
chattel mortgages. Lambert v. Security Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 58 Pa. Super. Ct.
624 (1915); Continental Ins. Co. v. Bair, 65 Ind. App. 502, 114 N. E. 763 (1917)
(judgment lien); Lavenstein v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 125 Va. 191, 10 S. E.
331 (1919). But it has been held that the condition against chattel mortgages
was breached by the execution of a trust deed. Roper v. National Fire Ins. Co.,
161 N. C. 151, 76 S. E. 869 (1912).
18. Beckley v. National Fire Ins. Co., 194 Iowa 1106, 190 N. W. 594 (1922);
Rowland v. Home Ins. Co., 82 Kan. 220, 108 Pac. 118 (1910).
19. Laird v. Littlefield, 164 N. Y. 597, 58 N. E. 1089 (1900).
20. Saffran v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 141 S. W. (2d) 98 (Mo. 1940).
21. Home Ins. Co. v. Scott, 284 U. S. 177 (1931).
22. Hart v. Home Mutual Ins. Ass'n, 208 Iowa 1030, 226 N. W. 781 (1929).
23. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Galloway, 281 S. W. 283 (Tex. 1926). Here,
by the endorsement of the note in blank, it was said to pass the title to the note
to the transferee, as the owner of the same in due course of trade, which created
an equitable lien in the transferee entitling it to be subrogated to the rights of
the transferor (mortgagee) in the proceeds from the policy in case of loss.
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part of the insured to get the insurer's consent with reference to a mortgage exist-
ing at the time of the issuance of the policy, although in one case it was said that
where the existence of the encumbrance isn't material to the risk, and where the
insurer makes no inquiry, the policy isn't invalidated by the insured's failure to
disclose.25
Most policies restrict the operation of the encumbrance clause to the case
where the insured property is personalty. The clauses generally read: "If the sub-
ject of.insurance be personalty, and the personalty becomes encumbered by a chat-
tel mortgage (or otherwise encumbered) the contract shall be void." Often a policy
containing such a clause will be issued on both real property and personal property.
In such a case, where a subsequent mortgage has been placed on the real property,
the principle of strict construction against insurer and against forfeiture has been
applied. 26 In the case of Royal Insurance Co. v. Bailey,27 it was held that since
the insurance contract made no mention of a mortgage on real estate, the parties
by omitting reference to real estate mortgages thereby excluded them from the
category of forbidden acts which would amount to a breach. A similar situation
arises, although not involving real estate, where only a part of the insured property
is made the subject of a mortgage or other encumbrance. In determining whether
the policy is made void thereby or not, courts have seemed to look behind the
reason for the inclusion of the encumbrance clause; 28 that is, the increase of the
risk to the insurer. It has been held that the policy is made void as to the un-
mortgaged part of the property insured only when the insurable risk on that part
is increased.29 In a recent Missouri case,30 where the contract of insurance covered
both household goods and personal effects, a mortgage was placed upon the house-
hold goods only. In holding against the insurance company, the court said:
25. Citizen's Ins. Co. v. Whitley, 252 Ky. 360, 67 S. W. (2d) 488 (1934).
Here, on a $500 policy, the insured's failure to disclose three mortgages on the
property totalling over $1100 was held not to relieve insurer of liability because
such encumbrance was not material to the risk. The test of such materiality used
by the court was: "And a fact is material to the risk only when it is such that
the insurer, acting in accordance with the custom and practices of insurance
companies, would not have issued the policy had he known it, and failure to disclose
a material fact is fraudulent when the insured knows it or an ordinary prudent
person would have known it to be material to the risk."
It seems that that encumbrance would be material to the risk, yet the court
held otherwise. This may be due to the violent conflict of testimony regarding
the statements between insured and insurer as to the existence of the mortgages
and also because the insured's solicitor did not qualify himself as a witness as to
whether insurance companies generally would or would not have accepted the
application if they had known of the existence of the mortgages.
For a contrary position, that a failure to disclose the encumbrance avoided
the policy whether the encumbrance was material to the risk or not, see: Loehner
v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., 17 Mo. 247 (1852).
26. Royal Ins. Co. v. Martin, 192 U. S. 149 (1904); McMaster v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 183 U. S. 25 (1901).
27. Royal Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 35 F. (2d) 916 (1929).
28. See note 1, tupra.
29. Sarkosian v. American Const. Fire Assur. Co., 267 I1. App. 443 (1933).
30. Ransom v. Potomac Ins. Co., 226 Mo. App. 664, 45 S. W. (2d) 95 (1932).
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"This chattel mortgage did not constitute a breach of the condition
against encumbrance and did not operate as a forfeiture for the following
reasons . . . The company did not protect against liability in the
event a part only of the subject of insurance be encumbered, and we cannot
amplify or extend the meaning of the words used to have such significance
to the disadvantage of the insured." 3'
Thus, in this matter, the courts strictly apply the doctrine of construction of in-
surance policies against the insurer.3 2
Some states have statutes making all statements in applications representa-
tions and providing in substance that only fraudulent or material misrepresentations
shall preclude recovery on property insurance policies.33 Yet it has been held that
the insured, by breaching the condition against mortgaging the insured property,
is not relieved from forfeiture by virtue of such a statute.84 And the fact that the
mortgage loan was used to improve the property does not destroy the effect of the
policy provision, even in the face of such a statute.3
Upon analysis of the cases involving encumbrance clauses, it seems that where
the courts feel that the encumbrance on the insured property increased the risk to
such extent as would possibly affect the issuing of the insurance had the company
known of the encumbrance, they strictly enforce the provisions. Where such is not
the case, they will not give effect to the provisions, thereby adopting an attitude
hostile toward insurance forfeitures.
RICHARD LEWIN
31. Western Assur. Co. v. Bronstein, 77 Colo. 408, 236 Pac. 1013 (1925);
Merchants Ins. Co. v. Harris, 51 Colo. 95, 116 Pac. 143 (1911); Born v. Home
Ins. Co., 110 Iowa 379, 81 N. W. 676 (1900); Fitzgibbons v. Insurance Co., 126
Iowa 52, 101 N. W. 454 (1904); Phenix Ins. Co. v. Lorenz, 7 Ind. App. 266, 33
N. E. 444 (1893); Bailey v. Homestead Fire Ins. Co., 16 Hun 503 (N. Y. 1879);
Sullivan v. Mercantile Town Mutual Ins. Co., 20 Okla. 460, 94 Pac. 676 (1908);
Mecca Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilderspin, 118 S. W. 1131 (Tex. 1909).
32. Boyer, C., in Kimbrough v. National Protective Ins. Ass'n, 225 Mo. App.
913, 35 S. W. (2d) 654, 658 (1930), ably states the doctrine in this manner: "The
policy is to be construed liberally in favor of the assured against the insurer. . .
The law does not favor forfeitures, and contracts of insurance must be so con-
strued, if possible, as not to defeat the claim to indemnity. The provisions in a
policy, limiting or avoiding liability, must be construed most strongly against the
insurer."
33. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 5823.
34. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Mullins, 218 Ky. 473, 291 S. W. 760 (1927);
Couch v. Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co., 220 Ky. 802, 295 S. W. 1054 (1928).
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